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Abstract 
The ability to automate the testing of software is critical in the successful 
acquisition of future Open Architecture (OA)-based weapon and combat systems.  In 
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of potential software configurations. As configurations change and OA software is 
put in new environments, the potential for finding or creating new bugs increases.  
The concept of using an operational profile, or environment model that generates 
inputs to an OA software module, based on probabilistic distributions, to assist in the 
automated testing process is critical for catching such bugs.  This paper describes 
an ongoing research effort on operational profile models, presents a summary of 
prior relevant work, and outlines an initial strategy for developing and implementing 
the operational profile model concept.  Following the model acquisition approach, a 
recommendation for future work is presented. 
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Introduction 
As more open systems are being fielded by the US Navy and its allies, 
traditional system boundaries and, subsequently, interfaces become more varied 
and more challenging to define.  The modularity of open systems and software adds 
significant flexibility in their configuration, enabling components to be added or 
modified to meet specific requirements with relative ease when compared to non-
open systems.  With this flexibility comes increased difficulty of conducting testing 
using traditional testing approaches.  New methods are required to effectively test 
such systems due to the increased potential for configuration changes.   
Current US Navy combat and weapon system test procedures require an 
integration test event with every change to the software or system configuration to 
certify that the software-intensive system-of-systems is stable and functional.  These 
integration test events are costly, require substantial coordination, and are often only 
conducted once every 1 to 2 years.  As more systems are moving to a modular open 
architecture (OA), software configurations are changing with increased frequency, 
requiring more testing—which is expensive and time consuming.  As the need for 
software testing increases, new testing methods are required to keep up.  
Automated software testing seems like a logical choice to deal with the increased 
demand.  Many people are working on various strategies to implement automated 
testing in this domain.  One idea which could assist in the overall effort is the use of 
operational profile models.  The combination of automated testing (driven by an 
operational profile model) with other research efforts in this domain (that focus on 
reducing the amount of testing required during a configuration change) is key to 
realizing a successful software test strategy for US Navy OA weapon and combat 
systems (Berzins & Dailey, 2009). 
An operational profile model, in terms of this study, is an a priori model that 
provides inputs to an OA software module under test. It does this by sampling from 
probability density functions (PDFs) that model specific inputs from the actual 
environment to the software module.  For this research, the operational profile 
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model’s purpose is to drive automated testing of OA software aimed at probabilistic 
reliability assessments supported by statistical confidence levels.  Ideally, the 
automated testing process would utilize the operational profile model for the 
generation of inputs to the software under test, and analysis could be done on 
system outputs in an automated black-box approach.  This study further focuses on 
determining how to most effectively develop and implement such models within the 
US Navy OA weapon system software domain. 
Testing driven by an operational profile model is very efficient because it 
generally identifies failures in the order of how often they occur.  This approach, 
therefore, rapidly reduces failure rates as testing proceeds, and the faults that create 
frequent failures are generally identified first (Musa, 2004).  Using operational profile 
models for testing of OA systems is also ideal because of the standards put in place 
to define the architecture.  The same standards are used by all software developers 
who are working to develop similar functioning software and to achieve successful 
integration within the open system.  If the operational profile model is developed with 
the standards in mind, then the same profile model could be used to test multiple 
iterations or releases of similar-functioning software.  The opposite also applies 
when testing within the OA domain.  If a software module is being reused from a 
previous application, testing it all over again within its new domain may seem to 
some as unnecessary because it is being reused to avoid unnecessary development 
costs.  However, it is necessary to retest proven software when its environment 
changes, and having an operational profile model to drive software testing is an 
efficient way to model the new environment. 
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Ongoing Operational Profile Research Effort 
When developing an operational profile model to be used for testing OA 
software, a designer must define the boundaries of the software module to be tested 
and the interfaces between it and its environment.  Such boundaries and interfaces 
should be definable based on OA standards for the particular type of software.  The 
latest OA standards within the US Navy weapon system community are defined by 
the Navy Standards Working Group (NSWG). 
The main task of this ongoing research effort is to derive a process for 
developing an operational profile model. Most of the effort is devoted to determining 
how to use historical and/or real-time source data to derive the PDFs that make up 
the operational profile model.  One of the main technical issues designers must 
resolve to effectively use historical data and/or real-time data is how to choose a 
realistic granularity for the profile model that will also result in adequate levels of 
confidence in the model’s accuracy.  Either discrete or continuous PDFs from some 
family of distributions, combined with a small number of parameters that can be 
estimated from the data are used to make up the modeled inputs for the system 
under test.  The available source data is finite and usually does not provide unlimited 
or high-levels of resolution, thus requiring some degree of approximation for the 
construction of the PDFs.  Along with the approximations, some degree of statistical 
uncertainty in the accuracy of the model exists and should be calculated by the 
profile developer.  The broader challenge is determining what methodology of 
calculation should be used, as well as linking the results of the calculation to 
confidence levels of the accuracy of the PDFs. 
It is important for designers to understand the set of all operational states in 
which the software module functions.  To achieve this understanding, designers 
could develop multiple profiles to replicate the different states, or designers could 
manipulate the distribution sampling from one prototype so it would cover all 
possibilities if the environment behavior is properly characterized.   
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Other considerations include understanding the dependencies that may exist 
between different inputs or between inputs and outputs.  A good understanding of 
the relationships—along with capturing the relationships, possibly using conditional 
statistics—is critical to properly modeling the operational environment. 
In summary, the designers’ ability to develop a complete operational profile 
model based on limited historical source data is vital for enabling successful 
automated testing.  This ongoing research is a necessary step in the successful 
evolution of software testing for US Navy OA combat systems and weapon system 
software programs. 
There are four main goals of this ongoing research effort: 
1. Determine an overall methodology for developing an operational profile 
model to drive automatic OA software testing. 
2. Determine how to efficiently use an operational profile model in the US 
Navy OA weapon system software automated testing domain. 
3. Determine how to calculate the reliability of the software component 
being tested using the operational profile model. 
4. Determine how to practically derive and calculate confidence in the 
accuracy of PDFs that accurately represent messages coming from the 
actual environment for a software module under test, including existing 
dependencies and multiple states of operation. 
A PDF can either be represented discretely or continuously.  When 
developing a discrete PDF, designers should organize source data points in 
meaningful ways—like a histogram, for example, which represents the range of 
possible inputs for the given message or signal.  Designers could then analyze and 
extrapolate it into a complete discrete probability distribution.  This completely 
defined probability distribution could be used empirically, or it could be modified to 
reflect certain operational conditions prior to sampling during testing.  When 
developing a continuous distribution, designers need to estimate parameters of the 
input distribution such as distribution type, mean, standard deviation, etc.  Just like 
the discrete distributions described above, designers could leave the derived PDF 
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alone, or they could modify it to reflect a particular operating condition and make it 
ready to be sampled from during testing.  Depending on the type of software input 
and available source data, one method may be more useful than the other.  Both 
options are considered during the course of this research.   
Modification of the initially calculated PDF may be desired in several cases.  
Designers could modify the test distribution to overestimate the mass on the tail 
ends of the distribution.  This would ultimately test a wider range of inputs for the OA 
software and, in some cases, would result in a more robust system under 
unexpected boundary conditions.  Depending on the implementation, testers often 
desire to develop both normal and worst-case operational profiles so that different 
operating scenarios can be covered. This approach ensures that the software will 
perform adequately not only in a normal operational mode, but also when under 
stress. 
Confidence in the accuracy of the derived PDFs can be calculated based on 
the sample size and expectation in a confidence interval calculation.  This type of 
calculation can be automatic and can be used to assess whether or not PDF is an 
accurate representation of the actual environment variable within some level of 
confidence.  For discrete PDFs, testers can generate histograms for sampling based 
on a variable bin size instead of the typical fixed interval that allows for the same 
number of samples to exist in each bin, thus varying the accuracy of the model but 
fixing the confidence level. 
Once a collection of statistically sound PDFs are developed which cover all 
inputs for a given software module under test, testers combine them together into an 
operational profile model that can generate a collection of samples based on the 
PDFs and other user-specified or programmed criteria—otherwise known as test 
cases.  Certain dependencies could exist between system inputs; thus, an 
operational-specific program will be generated that defines distributions with the 
captured dependencies, as well as how sampling should occur when trying to 
replicate certain operational states.  Lastly, there will be some user-interface 
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between the model and an external automated testing control source that will 
command the model to run in a particular state and start generating outputs.  This 
operational program, the collection of PDFs, and the interface to the automated 
testing control program will make up the operational profile model. 
When attempting to demonstrate this concept completely, it will also be 
necessary for the model to perform some automated analysis of the program output.  
An oracle should be made by profile developers which will flag errors in the software 
component’s behavior during testing.  This functionality is not really part of the 
operational profile of the system, but it is a necessary step of the automated testing 
process. In addition, it can ideally be implemented as part of the profile model 
operational program—which, in total, would have the operational profile, the user-
interface, and the oracle and possibly other test-related reporting features. 
For a US Naval weapon system prototype implementation, NPS researchers 
will identify specific software modules, along with their interfaces,  using input from 
the NSWG and other system requirements specification sources.  The interfaces will 
be characterized based on a limited amount of real-world data in all modes of 
operation, and a concept-demonstration prototype operational profile model will be 
generated by NPS researchers including the predicted confidence levels in the 
profile.  The accuracy of the prototype will be checked by running multiple test cases 
and comparing the test results to a complete set of actual, real-world manual test 
results.  The goal of this accuracy checking is to determine the minimum acceptable 
confidence level in the model. This level enables the testing to be effectively and 
reliably conducted.  The designers will standardize all methods, calculations, and 
algorithms used to create the PDFs based on applicability to particular message or 
signal types.  As part of the operational profile model, the designer will develop and 
combine a user interface, output checking oracle, and other necessary functionality 
needed to conduct automatic testing.  Then, the designer will use the lessons 
learned from the implementation of a prototype, combined with other analyses, to 
put together an optimized methodology for acquiring operational profiles within the 
US Navy weapon system domain. 
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Summary of Prior Relevant Work 
Testing in an Open Environment 
One of OAs benefits is to reduce the risk of bugs by having defined standards 
for interfacing components.  Testing in an OA environment requires a modified 
approach when compared to traditional software testing.  Testing expenses required 
for OA systems include specialized testing tools, test preparation and management, 
unit, functional, integration, regression and user acceptance testing.  Benefits 
provided by OA in the testing domain include the following: 
Open Standards can reduce the extent of testing at a component unit level, if 
open source or vendor implementations are used.  Integration testing may be 
reduced if other components of the system, especially 3rd party components, have 
been previously been designed and tested to be compatible with the relevant Open 
Standards.  Over time, the use of OSR-conformant components can also reduce the 
cost of regression testing.   
Modularity best supports unit testing when well-defined interfaces 
encompass the full functionality of the component, and testing can be designed 
before development is completed.  Low dependency metrics in a system reduce the 
number of integration tests that are needed because there are fewer points of 
variability at the system level.   
Extensibility can directly support testing by making it easy to instrument the 
component and the system with no impact on the system functionality.  Functional 
extensions to a component are also well-defined; thus, extending unit and systems 
tests should be relatively straightforward. Even regression testing is unlikely to 
require extensive modification.   
Interoperability requires additional testing when components are created. 
However, OA returns the investment by facilitating integration in subsequent use of 
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components—thus leveraging prior testing efforts associated with component design 
and development.   
These benefits are nullified when the process is constrained by traditional US 
Navy combat system and weapon system testing approaches.  Current practices 
require a complete system integration test event to be conducted with every 
configuration change, often occurring once every two years.  This approach was 
adopted long ago because of the safety and integration concerns that come with 
software-intensive weapon and combat systems.  Complete system integration 
testing is costly under traditional system architectures and often requires retesting of 
proven system elements that did not change from one baseline to the next.  Testing 
in this way increased the time it took to field new technologies or capabilities due to 
the cost-driven, bi-annual schedule.  This approach will be even more inefficient if 
used on OA-based systems.  The modularity and scalability benefits of OA allow for 
quick configuration changes to update and tailor capabilities to mission needs.  
These benefits will be nullified if the current US Navy test strategy is used, as the 
cost would grow exponentially with constant complete integration testing; likewise, 
the needed configuration changes would not be made when needed.  Because of 
this, Test & Evaluation (T&E) could be the Achilles heel for US Navy OA initiatives.  
New technology, processes and policies are needed to safely reduce this effort and 
free resources for testing new functionality (Berzins & Dailey, 2009).  These new 
techniques should be capable of determining when it is safe not to retest a 
component when the overall system configuration changes. 
Determining when It Is Safe Not to Retest a Component 
following Changes in Configuration 
In his 2008 text, Berzins explains that if the requirements related to a 
component have not changed, and the behavior of the components has not 
changed, then retesting may not be necessary.  The range of conditions under which 
a component is expected to provide its operational capabilities is particularly relevant 
to testing and re-testing.  The rest of this section addresses how to statically and 
dynamically check that the behavior of a component has not changed, assuming for 
 - 9 - 
the moment that its requirements and range of operating conditions have not 
changed. 
A type of dependency analysis known as program slicing can be used to 
identify parts of the unchanged code that have the same behavior in the new release 
as in previous one (Weisser, 1984).  A program slice at a given observation point is 
a self-contained subset of the code in the sense that it contains all of the code that 
can affect the behavior visible at the observation point.  If two different programs 
have the same slice for a given observation point, then they have the same visible 
behavior at that point.  Consequently, if the new release has the same slice as the 
old release for a given service, then that service will have exactly the same behavior 
in the new release as in the old one and, consequently, may not need regression 
testing (Gallagher, 1991).  This fact is useful because program slices can be 
computed for software systems on practical (large) scales.  The testing-reduction 
method that follows from this observation is to compute the slice of each service with 
respect to the new release and the old release, and retest only the services for 
which these slices differ. 
In the context of technology-advancement upgrades, the test-reduction 
method described above must be augmented with focused, automated testing to 
produce a substantial reduction in retesting.  Technology upgrades usually run on a 
new version of the operating system.  If the source code of the operating system is 
proprietary and, hence, not available for static analysis (commonly true, except for 
open source systems such as LINUX), then the only safe assumption is that all 
operating system services have been impacted by the upgrade to the new version.  
Thus, any service whose slice includes a dependency on a system call would be 
potentially impacted and would have to be retested, based on the simple slicing 
approach outlined in the previous paragraph.  This is likely to include most of the 
application-level modules—severely limiting the amount of savings that can be 
obtained using slicing alone. 
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Automated testing, however, can enable larger reductions in retesting if it is 
focused on the middleware interface to the underlying operating system services.  
Fortunately, interviews with representative stakeholders confirmed that most Navy 
systems with open architectures are designed around a middleware interface that 
encapsulates all operating system calls.  Such middleware interfaces are also 
prevalent in other DoD systems, including the US Army’s Future Combat System 
(FCS).  Application architectures are typically designed in this way to ease the job of 
porting the application to new operating systems, whether they are new releases of 
the same product or different products.  Consequently, each new release of the 
operating system and the neighboring middleware layer are both designed to 
preserve the observable behavior of the previously available system calls if at all 
possible—even if the details of the implementation may vary from one release to the 
next.  If we know that the observable behavior of a given system call is the same in 
the old and the new version of the operating system, then we can truncate the slice 
at the middleware layer for that call, and conclude that the behavior of an application 
service is unaffected by the OS change if its abbreviated slices in the two versions 
are the same.  The proposed enhancement to dependency analysis using program 
slicing is to check this property for each system call in the middleware layer via 
automated testing.  
This same strategy can also be applied at higher levels of middleware.  For 
example, for the common case of applications that have been developed for the 
Java or .NET platforms, the interface to operating system resources is the 
framework runtime, such as the interface to the Java foundation classes.  One 
related viable strategy for reducing testing of unchanged application code is 
bounding slicing by the interfaces at this level and using automated testing to show 
equivalent behaviors of the two releases at these interfaces.  A related, common 
pattern of changes that should not affect behavior involves framework evolution, in 
which applications are recoded to migrate from “deprecated” (soon to become 
obsolete) interfaces to the corresponding new versions of the interfaces.  Although 
such changes produce differences in the code, they are intended to preserve 
behavior, and should be amenable to the automated test strategy.  Thus, modules, 
 - 11 - 
one level above the framework runtime interfaces, are additional candidates for 
automated testing and slicing cutoff boundaries. 
Automated testing is attractive in these contexts because a simple, reliable 
implementation of a “test oracle” is possible for the encapsulated operating system’s 
services.  A “test oracle” is a process for automatically determining which test 
outputs pass and which ones fail.  The “unchanged behavior” condition can be easily 
checked by software for a given set of input data.  This is possible since both the old 
and the new versions of the operating system are available for testing, and test 
scaffolding software can compare the results of the two versions via equality tests.  
The existence of such a “test oracle” implies that the OS middleware testing process 
can be completely automated—enabling economic and practical testing with 
statistically significant sample sizes that support very high confidence levels, or, in 
some cases, even exhaustive testing of the operating system interfaces that 
supports definite conclusions.  The proposed automated testing process would, thus, 
classify all of the services in the middleware interface to the operating system into 
two groups: those whose behavior is the same in both versions of the operating 
system (the preserved services), and those whose behavior differs in the two 
versions (the modified services).  We expect the first group to be much larger than 
the second group. 
In such cases, we can cut off slices at the system calls to the preserved 
services, and conclude that unmodified application components do not have to be 
retested unless their slices differ or contain system calls that invoke one of the 
modified services.  The operating system interface always needs to be thoroughly 
retested, but this can be done by the affordable automated process described 
above. 
The above analysis depends on the assumption that we can accept a 
statistical inference about the unchanged behavior of the operating system’s calls, if 
the statistical confidence level is high enough.  Since most military decisions must 
be based on information that has the same degree of uncertainty, we do not expect 
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lack of certainty to be a problem in principle.  We, therefore, consider how to 
determine what level of confidence would be “high enough,” and how many test 
cases are necessary to reach that level of confidence. 
We start with a consideration that should be meaningful to the stakeholders: if 
the mean time between observations of a behavioral difference in a given operating 
system’s service is substantially (k times) longer than a mission, it is acceptable to 
ignore risks due to the possibility of such an unexpected difference.  The meaning of 
“substantially” can be expressed as a numerical safety factor k that can be 
understood and set by system stakeholders based on their tolerance for risk.  
Next, we measure the mean number of executions per mission es for each 
service s in the middleware interface to the operating system.  The objective of the 
automated testing for each service s is to ensure the mean number of executions 
between observed differences in the behavior of service s is at least Ns, where 
Ns = k es 
Theorem 4.3 from Howden (1987) can then be used to determine the required 
number of test cases Ts for each service: 
Ts = Ns log2 Ns 
If we run Ts test cases that are independently drawn from the probability 
distribution characterizing the mission (called the operational profile), the theorem 
will enable us to conclude that the mean number of executions is at least Ns with a 
statistical confidence level (1 – 1/Ns); however, this is contingent upon none of the Ts 
test cases showing any differences in the behavior of the services under the new 
version of the operating system from those in the previously released version.  
The rationale for this choice of confidence level is that it makes the probability 
of making a false positive conclusion no more than the acceptable frequency of 
behavioral differences—thus scaling the risk due to random sampling errors to 
match the specified maximum acceptable failure rate.  False positive conclusions 
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correspond to cases in which the frequency of behavioral differences in the new 
release of the operating system service in question is actually greater than the target 
bound (1/Ns), but the automated testing procedure failed to observe a difference due 
to random sampling fluctuations that caused conforming results to appear purely by 
chance.  The test set size Ts has been chosen to make the probability of such a 
chance observation at most (1/Ns).  
Thorough statistical testing of the operating system interfaces has the 
additional benefit of increasing the confidence that hardware differences (and 
possibly different versions of the compilers, linkers and loaders) have not affected 
the behavior of the applications built using these services.  
Cost of Automated Testing  
There are several different kinds of automated testing.  The most common 
kind is semi-automated testing.  This approach automates the type of testing 
currently performed manually. It is commonly the first kind of automated testing 
implemented in an organization because it does not involve any process changes.  
In this type of approach, the test cases are still developed individually by test 
engineers, but the test cases are run automatically, and the results are classified into 
pass or fail categories automatically—often by comparison to previously captured 
test outputs that were originally individually examined and categorized by people.  In 
this approach, execution and categorization of test results is automated, but the 
choice of test cases and the initial pass/fail decisions are not.  This approach saves 
appreciable time and effort relative to a completely manual approach, but the human 
effort required is still proportional to the number of test cases. 
Another approach particularly relevant in our context is automated statistical 
testing.  In this approach, the choice of test cases and the initial pass/fail decisions 
are automated, as well.  This makes a great difference because the human effort 
involved does not increase with the number of test cases to be executed.  This 
enables economical application of the very large test sets needed to achieve the 
coverage required to support high levels of statistical confidence in the dependability 
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of the software.  The high levels of statistical confidence are needed to avoid testing 
for other unchanged code based on indirect evidence that the behavior of the 
underlying services on which the unchanged code depends has not changed. 
The context identified in the previous section is well suited for automated 
statistical testing, because the choice of test cases and the initial pass/fail decisions 
are easily automated in that context: the first can be done by random sampling from 
the operational profile, and the second by comparison of the results produced by the 
previous release of the software to those produced by the new release. 
The variation in the number of the test cases Ts required as a function of the 
acceptable risk of false positive conclusions (1/Ns) is illustrated in Table 1. 
Ns C Ts 
103 0.999 1.0 x 104 
104 0.9999 1.3 x 105 
105 0.99999 1.7 x 106 
106 0.999999 2.0 x 107 
107 0.9999999 2.3 x 108 
108 0.99999999 2.7 x 109 
109 0.999999999 3.0 x 1010 
Table 1. Number of Test Cases Required  
for Different Levels of Risk Tolerance 
Ns: Desired lower bound on mean number of executions between differences 
C: Statistical confidence level 
Ts: Number of independent random test cases required 
Figure 1 shows how the cost characteristics of the proposed automated 
testing approach compare to the costs of manual testing.  The cost curves are close 
to straight lines; the fixed costs of automated testing are larger than for manual 
testing, and the marginal cost of adding another test case is much smaller for 
automated testing than for manual testing. 
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Figure 1. Testing Cost Characteristics  
In order to determine the crossover points, we must obtain and analyze 
experimental data. This process is still ongoing. However, we expect automated 
testing to be affordable—even for the very large numbers of test cases needed for 
high confidence in stability of OS services across different releases.  We also expect 
manual and semi-automated approaches not to be affordable when we test to high 
confidence. 
Regarding the time and other resources to perform the proposed automated 
statistical testing, we can note the following: 
1. It typically takes a small amount of time to perform a single system call. 
2. Testing using independent, random samples is easily parallelizable 
and could be effectively spread over large numbers of processors 
using well-established techniques—such as Google’s Map Reduce 
programming model (Lammel, 2008)—if very high confidence levels 
are needed. 
3. Behavior of operating system calls can be tested independently of 
other shipboard systems. Such testing does not require interactions 
with human operators. 
Since the testing process is completely automated, the variable cost of these 
tests is due to computing time and hardware, but not to human effort.  The benefit of 
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the automated statistical test approach described here is that there are no variable 
costs for labor.  Since computing resources are currently inexpensive and steadily 
getting cheaper, even the relatively large numbers of test cases needed for high 
confidence are likely to be affordable. 
This approach does involve some fixed costs for human effort that may be 
higher than in less-disciplined manual approaches.  These costs are due to the need 
for the following activities: 
1. Measurement of operational profiles—i.e., the frequency distributions 
of operating system calls and their associated input parameters.  
Instrumented versions of the software can be used during exercises to 
collect measurements of the operational profiles, or, if the 
computational overhead of doing this is acceptable, measurements 
could also be collected during actual operations. Ongoing research is 
developing systematic, computer-assisted methods for this process. 
2. Coding more sophisticated test-driver software that includes code for 
generating random samples from the measured operational profiles, 
code that implements test oracles as described above, and code that 
keeps track of testing statistics and reports them. 
Testing with Operational Profiles 
An operational profile has been defined as the set of input events that the 
software will receive during execution, along with the probability that the events will 
occur and the set of all input events generated by external hardware and software 
systems that the software is expected to interact with during execution (Voas, 2000). 
Taking that definition a bit further with respect to probabilities, an operational 
profile model, in terms of this study, is a statistical model—developed with some 
previous knowledge of the population—that provides inputs to an OA software 
system module under test based on a sampling from PDFs (which represent the 
interfaces from the actual environment to the software module).  The operational 
profile model’s purpose is to drive automated testing of OA software aimed at 
probabilistic reliability assessments supported by statistical confidence levels.  
Ideally, the automated testing process utilizes the operational profile model for the 
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generation of inputs to the software under test and possibly analysis of the system 
outputs.   
Accurate estimates of operational profiles, preferably based on actual 
measurements, are necessary because in all practical cases, the reliability of a 
software system is meaningless without firm knowledge of the operational profile.  
This claim is based on the hypothesis that all real systems have at least one input 
value x for which they perform correctly, and at least one other input value y for 
which they do not.  If we know x and y, we can construct a spectrum of possible 
operational profiles for which the reliability of the same system ranges from 0 to 1 
and attains every value in between.  
The above line of reasoning shows that the only systems whose reliabilities 
do not depend on the operational environment are those that fail for all possible 
inputs (reliability uniformly 0, not interesting), and those that operate correctly for all 
possible inputs (reliability uniformly 1, not attainable in practice for large systems). 
For all other systems, the reliability is determined by the operational profile 
and can vary widely for different operational contexts.  This has serious implications 
for component reuse, which is a cornerstone of the Navy OA initiative. 
Operational profiles have been used by the testing research community for 
many years and have been applied in many contexts. For example, they have been 
measured and used to assess the reliability of telephone-switching software. 
Testing driven by an operational profile is very efficient because it identifies 
failures (and, hence, the faults causing them), on the average, in the order of how 
often they occur.  This approach rapidly reduces failure intensity as a test proceeds, 
and the faults that cause frequent failures are found and removed first.  Users will 
also detect failures on average in order of their frequency, if they have not already 
been found in test (Musa, 2004). 
When we want to maximize the reliability of a fielded system (and thereby 
maximally enhance the user/customer experience) and have no better information 
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about how to find bugs, any other allocation of testing resources is sub-optimal.  
Testing in accordance with an operational profile can, therefore, be a key part of a 
test automation strategy (Binder, 2004). 
An operational profile is the estimated relative frequency (i.e., probability) for 
each “operation” that a system under test supports.  Operations map easily to use 
cases—hence operational profiles and object-oriented development work well 
together.  However, the Unified Modeling Language (UML) standard for Use Cases 
does not provide sufficient information for automated testing.  Extended Use Cases 
are consistent with the UML, and include domain and probability information 
necessary for automated testing (Binder, 1999).  
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Operational Profile Model Development 
Methodology 
Process Overview 
The methodology defined in this section defines how to develop an 
operational profile model used to test a US Navy OA weapons or combat systems 
software component under test.  This approach is broken down into several areas—
including identifying the component, understanding its operation and interfaces, 
characterizing the inputs statistically, characterizing the outputs (for input 
dependency analysis and for understanding of how to detect bugs), deriving testing 
profiles, creating the operational profile user-interface and core functionality, and 
lastly, developing the supporting documentation.   
This approach was developed by NPS as part of the ongoing Operational 
Profile Model research effort and is in the process of being validated via the 
development of a concept-demonstration prototype model.  There it will be critiqued 
and optimized as the study continues.  Based on the results of the prototype model 
development and component testing, we will present a refined approach to acquire 
an operational profile model for testing of US Navy OA weapons system software at 
the completion of the ongoing research study. 
Steps to Develop and Operational Profile Model 
1. Identify Component Boundaries 
a. Identify Component 
b. Identify Component’s Environment 
2. Understand Component Operation 
a. Identify Inputs 
b. Identify Outputs 
c. Identify Controls 
d. Identify Mechanisms 
e. Understand Component’s Operational Requirements 
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f. Understand Component’s Technical Requirements 
g. Identify States of Operation 
3. Define Component Interfaces 
a. Define Inputs 
b. Define Input Formats 
c. Define Outputs 
d. Define Output Formats 
4. Characterize Inputs (For Operational Profile PDF Derivation) 
a. Gather Available Real-world/Historical Input Data 
b. Organize Real-world/Historical Input Data 
c. Analyze Real-world/Historical Input Data for Each Historical 
Environment 
i. Relate Operational Data to Software Inputs 
ii. Assess Software Input Dependencies 
1. Assess Dependencies between Inputs 
2. Assess Dependencies with Time 
3. Assess Dependencies between Inputs and Outputs 
4. Assess Dependencies with Operational State 
iii. Derive Operational Probabilistic Characterization for Each Input 
1. Utilize Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) for Continuous 
PDFs 
2. Utilize Variable-width Histogram Bin Approach for 
Discrete PDFs 
3. Utilize Bayesian Approach for Probabilistic Dependencies 
4. Utilize COTS Analysis Tools for Calculations & Analysis 
a. S-Plus/R 
b. MATLAB 
c. Oracle Crystal Ball 
iv. Calculate/Determine How to Maximize Confidence in Results 
1. Calculate Confidence Based on Sample Size 
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2. Utilize Variable-width Histogram Bin Approach to Fix 
Confidence 
v. Repeat for Each Historical Environment 
d. Assess Gaps in Real-world/Historical Input Data 
e. Determine Historical and Current Operational Environment Differences 
i. Analyze Current Environment Changes 
ii. Relate Environment Differences to Affected Input Changes 
f. Modify Historical Probabilistic Characterizations to Reflect Current 
Environment 
i. Analyze Profiles of Historical Environments 
1. Relate Calculations to Historical Environments 
2. Relate Confidence Level to Available Data 
ii. Predict Necessary Changes to Inputs for the Current 
Environment 
1. Utilize Bayesian Approach for Dependency Analysis 
2. Minimize Use of Subjective Analysis (if possible) 
iii. Acquire Relevant Data for Current Environment Analysis (if 
possible) 
iv. Analyze Relevant New Environment Data to Compare with 
Predicted Changes (if possible) 
v. Assess Software Input Dependencies 
vi. Derive Operational Probabilistic Characterization for Each 
Current Environment Input  
vii. Calculate/Determine How to Maximize Confidence in Current 
Environment 
5. Characterize Outputs (for Oracle Development) 
a. Define Component Operational Failures 
i. Define Failures by Event  
ii. Define by Defining Success, and Relate Any Other Behavior as 
Failure 
b. Relate Operational Failures to Specific Observable Output Behavior 
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c. Determine Necessary Conditions/Analysis Required to Detect Output 
Failures 
6. Identify Testing Profiles 
a. Derive Operational Testing Profile(s) for Operational Test & Evaluation 
(OT&E) 
b. Derive Stress-testing Profile(s) for Developmental Test & Evaluation 
(DT&E) 
7. Develop Operational Profile Model User Interface 
a. Develop Component Loading Interface 
b. Develop Operational Profile Loading Interface 
i. Include Fields Used to Load Desired Probability Distributions for 
Each Input 
ii. Include Fields for Selecting Desired Number of Test Cases to 
be Generated 
iii. Include Fields for Starting/Stopping Test 
c. Develop Output Analyzer 
i. Include Fields Used for Defining Conditions of Failure 
ii. Include Fields for Loading Failure Analysis Scripts 
d. Develop Analytical Interface 
i. Include Fields Identifying Current Progress of Testing 
1. Number/Percentage of Tests Complete  
2. Number/Percentage of Failed Runs 
3. Analysis of Failed Runs (Real Time or Upon Completion) 
4. Calculation of Confidence in Software Reliability 
8. Develop Operational Profile Model Core Functionality 
a. Develop/Code Operational Profile Model Input Generator 
b. Develop/Code Operational Profile Model Interfaces to User & 
Component 
c. Develop/Code Operational Profile Output Analyzer Oracle & Data 
Logger 
9. Develop Operational Profile Supporting Documentation 
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Recommendations for Future Work 
To realize the benefits of automated testing driven by an operational profile 
model, future work will need to be done in support of Operational Profile Models and 
in other related domains.  The next step in this domain will be focused on the 
implementation of an operational profile model concept demonstration prototype, 
which will be used to validate and refine the proposed development methodology 
outlined above.  A way to validate both the accuracy of the operational profile model 
and the reliability of the software being tested needs to be developed and refined.  
Also, if specific environment inputs exist that may lead to failures with severe 
consequences and that cannot be confidently estimated using conventional 
techniques, it may be necessary to develop new techniques for these specific cases.  
Lastly, research into the possibility of using operational profile models in an “open-
loop” testing mode—instead of a black-box mode—would drastically reduce 
automated testing computing time for the testing of components with multiple states 
of operation.  This open-loop approach would make it possible for any state to be set 
at the same time as a specific input—without the need of previous input files to get 
the component to the state of operation. 
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